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The Iasi-Ungheni pipeline: 
a means of achieving energy independence from Russia?
Moldova’s attempts at gas supply diversification
Kamil Całus
Since taking power in 2009, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) has been trying to end Mol-
dova’s dependence on Russian gas. Currently, natural gas accounts for about 50% of the country’s 
energy balance (excluding Transnistria), and Gazprom has a monopoly on the supply of gas to the 
republic. The key element of Chișinău’s diversification project is the construction of the Iasi-Ung-
heni pipeline, which is designed to link the Moldovan and Romanian gas transmission networks, 
and consequently make it possible for Moldova to purchase gas from countries other than Russia. 
Despite significant delays, construction work on the interconnector began in August 2013. The Mol-
dovan government sees ensuring energy independence from Russia as its top priority. The signifi-
cance and urgency of the project reflect Chișinău’s frustration at Moscow’s continued attempts to 
use its monopoly of Moldova’s energy sector to exert political pressure on the republic.
Nonetheless, despite numerous declarations by Moldovan and Romanian politicians, the Iasi-
-Ungheni pipeline will not end Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas before the end of the 
current decade. This timeframe is unrealistic for two reasons: first, because an additional gas 
pipeline from Ungheni to Chisinau and a compression station must be constructed, which will 
take at least five years and will require significant investment; and second, because of the un-
relenting opposition to the project coming from Gazprom, which currently controls Moldova’s 
pipelines and will likely try to torpedo any energy diversification attempts. Independence from 
Russian gas will only be possible after the the Gazprom-controlled Moldova-GAZ, the operator 
of the Moldovan transmission network and the country’s importer of natural gas, is divided. The 
division of the company has in fact been envisaged in the EU’s Third Energy Package, which is 
meant to be implemented by Moldova in 2020.
The characteristics of the Moldovan 
gas market
Moldova virtually does not have its own source 
of natural gas1, and so 100% of its gas demand 
is currently being met by imports from Rus-
sia’s Gazprom; the gas is sent to Moldova via 
a pipeline across Transnistria. In addition, al-
1 In August of this year, Moldova’s Economy Minister an-
nounced plans to launch prospecting projects for gas 
(especially shale gas) and crude oil in the country.
most all (about 90%) of the electricity produced 
in Moldova is generated by three gas-fired 
combined heat and power plants, which joint-
ly meet about 20% of the country’s electricity 
needs. The remaining 80% is purchased from 
the Ukrainian company DTEK Power Trade and 
from Moldavskaya GRES, located in Transnistria 
and owned by the Russian state energy group 
Inter RAO UES. Moldova’s biggest gas consumer 
is its energy and heating sector (43%); mean-
while household and industrial consumers pur-
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chase just 30% and 21% of gas respectively2. 
In recent years, Moldova has seen a significant 
drop in natural gas consumption. Whereas in 
2005 the country consumed 1.315 bcm of gas 
per year (excluding Transnistria), in 2012 the fig-
ure dropped to 0.98 bcm3. The reduction has 
been linked primarily to a drop in consumption 
by households and power companies. In the 
first six months of 2013 these two groups con-
sumed 8.5% and 5.5% less gas than in the same 
period the previous year. The drop in demand 
has been caused primarily by the rapidly rising 
price of gas: in 2005, Moldova paid around $80 
per 1000 m³ of Russian gas, while by 2012 the 
price had risen to $382.
The company responsible for the purchase and 
management of the Moldovan gas network is 
Moldova-GAZ, established in 1999. Moldova- 
-GAZ also controls the country’s transit pipe-
lines and two gas distributors: Moldovatrans-
gaz, located on the right bank of the Dniester, 
and Tiraspoltransgas-Pridnestrovie located in 
Transnistria. In addition, the company has 18 
subsidiaries responsible for regional gas dis-
tribution (12 on the right bank of the Dniester 
and 6 in Transnistria). Although Moldova-GAZ 
has the status of a national operator, it has 
been controlled by Gazprom, which holds 50% 
plus one share of the company. The Moldo-
van state holds a 35% stake in Moldova-GAZ 
while the Property Management Committee of 
Transnistria, managed by the government of 
the breakaway republic, owns 13.44% of the 
shares4. The remaining shares are in the hands 
of individual investors5.
2 Source: Moldova’s National Agency for Energy Regula-
tion (2012). http://www.anre.md/upl/file/monitoring/
gas/Piata%20gazelor%20naturale%20luni%2012%20
2012.pdf
3 According to official figures, Moldova consumes about 3 
bcm of gas a year. In practice, however, about 2 bcm of 
this amount is consumed by Transnistria.
4 In practice, Gazprom controls a stake of approximate-
ly 63.4% in Moldova-GAZ. In 2005, the government in 
Tiraspol announced that it was withdrawing from the 
company, and that its shares would be transferred to 
Gazprom.
5 The figures cited in this paper come from the official 
website of Moldova-GAZ; http://moldovagaz.md/menu/
ru/about-company/mg-today
Moldova is a major transit country for Russian 
gas destined for Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Greece, amongst others. However, the amount 
of gas transported through Moldova has been 
gradually decreasing. From 25.3 bcm in 2005, 
the transit volumes had dropped to 19.9 bcm 
by 2012. This represents approximately 11% of 
Russia’s total gas exports, and generates about 
$50-$60 million in annual revenue for Moldova. 
It is likely that if the construction of the South 
Stream gas pipeline goes ahead as expected, this 
trend will accelerate, and eventually Moldova’s 
role as a transit country will become marginal.
Currently, Moldova lacks any pipeline links with 
countries that would allow it to diversify its gas 
supply. The existing pipelines connecting Mol-
dova to Ukraine and Romania are being used to 
supply Russian gas to these two countries and 
to other customers in southern Europe. Con-
sequently, these links cannot be used to trans-
port gas in the opposite direction. In addition, 
Moldova does not have its own underground 
gas storage facilities that could be used to en-
sure an uninterrupted supply of gas to Moldo-
van consumers. Russia often exploits this fact 
to pressure Moldova into decisions which give 
Moscow political advantage.
Russia’s gas policy towards Moldova
The last four-year gas contract between Mol-
dova and Russia expired at the end of 2011. 
Since then Russia has refused to sign a new 
agreement, in an effort to pressure Moldova 
into withdrawing from the EU-led Energy Com-
munity, which aims to increase the security of 
energy supplies, support the integration of the 
The company responsible for the purchase 
of gas and management of the Moldo-
van gas network is Moldova-GAZ, which 
is controlled by Gazprom. The Moldovan 
state holds only about 35% of it’s shares.
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energy market across Europe, and promote 
competition in the energy sector. Moscow is 
particularly keen on persuading Moldova to 
abandon its plans for the implementation of 
the EU’s Third Energy Package, which Chişinău 
agreed to adopt when it joined the Energy 
Community in 2010. This is important for Mos-
cow for both economic and political reasons. 
Under the terms of the Third Package, trans-
mission, sale and production of natural gas 
would have to be carried out by independent 
operators. The implementation of the new reg-
ulations would therefore require splitting Mol-
dova-GAZ into two legally independent com-
panies, or establishing a transmission system 
operator independent of Gazprom. This could 
effectively strip the Russian gas monopoly of 
its control over Moldova’s transit pipelines. By 
protecting its economic interests, Russia is also 
trying to advance its political interests; this is 
because Chişinău’s potential withdrawal from 
the Energy Community would also block Mol-
dova’s successful integration with the European 
Union6. At the same time, Russia is also seeking 
to retain its position as a monopoly gas supplier 
to the Moldovan market.
To exert additional political pressure on 
Chişinău, Russia has been bringing up the issue 
of the so-called Transnistrian gas debt, which 
6 In October 2012, EU Energy Commissioner Günther 
Oettinger publicly described Russia’s actions as “pure 
blackmail” of the government in Chişinău. He stressed, 
however, that if Moldova succumbed to Moscow’s de-
mands and left the Energy Community, Chişinău’s de-
cision would be tantamount to abandoning plans for 
integration with the European Union, and the country 
would be doomed to a fate similar to that of Belarus.
has already reached over $4 billion. The debt 
has been accumulating as a result of a con-
scious decision by the Transnistrian govern-
ment (with Moscow’s de facto approval) not to 
pay for the gas which for years has been sup-
plied to Transnistria under Moscow’s contract 
with Moldova7. Although officially Moldova is 
not liable for the debt, it has been suggested 
that a protocol signed between Gazprom and 
Chişinău in December 2006 is likely to include 
government guarantees for any debt incurred 
by Moldova-GAZ. This means that Russia could 
potentially call in the debt at any point it sees 
fit. Such threats have been made in the past, for 
example when Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s deputy 
prime minister and special representative of 
the Russian president for Transnistria, said in 
April 2012 that “Chişinău does not recognise 
Transnistria as an equal partner, and therefore 
Transnistria’s unpaid gas bill will have to be set-
tled by Moldova”8.
High-ranking Russian politicians have frequent-
ly stressed that if Moldova were to agree to 
withdraw from the Energy Community, it could 
easily negotiate and sign a new long-term gas 
contract with Russia. The deal would include 
a price discount (of allegedly up to 30%) and 
would resolve the issue of the Transnistrian gas 
bill9. Consequently, Moldova’s ruling coalition 
has made several concessions to the Kremlin, 
including a decision to postpone the implemen-
tation of the Third Energy Package from 2015 
to 2020. However, this has failed to have any 
effect on Moscow’s position. As a result, the 
government in Chişinău has abandoned fur-
ther attempts to appease Moscow and has re-
sisted continued pressure from the Kremlin. In 
mid-September 2012, President Nicolae Timofti 
officially stated that Moldova would not swap 
European integration for cheaper gas from Rus-
7 For more on the Transnistrian gas debt, see: http://
w w w.osw.waw.p l /en /publ ikac je /osw- commen-
tary/2013-05-16/aided-economy-characteristics-transn-
istrian-economic-model
8 http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/20120418060404.shtml
9 http://www.kommersant.md/node/10121
Moscow is particularly keen on persuading 
Moldova to abandon its plans for the imple-
mentation of the EU’s Third Energy Pack-
age, which Chişinău agreed to adopt when 
it joined the Energy Community in 2010.
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sia. Nonetheless, it is difficult to predict wheth-
er the country will be able to resist Moscow’s 
pressure if the price of Russian gas continues 
to rise, or if gas supplies are disrupted. At the 
moment, Russian gas is being imported to Mol-
dova under a contract which was extended in 
December 2012 for another 12 months. Accord-
ing to a statement in September by the Moldo-
van Economy Minister, Russia has since agreed 
to a new extension, this time until the end of 
2014, although Moscow has not yet officially 
confirmed this information.
Attempts at gas supply diversification 
Since 1991, successive Moldovan governments 
have failed to take any real steps to diversify the 
country’s gas supply routes. Throughout this 
time, Moldova has not had the money to finance 
the expansion of its cross-border gas network, 
which is the only way to make the diversifica-
tion of gas supplies possible. In addition, the 
relatively low cost of Russian gas since 2005 
has rendered any such attempts economically 
unfeasible. The first signs of a possible policy 
shift in this area appeared only after a wors-
ening of diplomatic relations between Moscow 
and Chişinău in 200310; however in the end no 
concrete measures were implemented. Despite 
a marked deterioration in relations between the 
two countries after 2003 and despite a gradual 
rise in the price of Russian gas, Moldova’s then 
Communist government not only failed to take 
any steps towards energy independence from 
Russia, but its decisions seem to have cemented 
Russia’s presence on the Moldovan gas market. 
The pro-Moscow approach was clearly visible, 
for example, in Chişinău’s 2007 Energy Strategy 
until 2020 document, which emphasised the im-
portance of Russian gas supplies and envisaged 
10 Relations worsened after, in the autumn of 2003, the 
government in Chişinău rejected Moscow’s plan to unite 
Moldova and Transnistria, known as the Kozak Memo-
randum.
the strengthening of Moldova’s role as a tran-
sit country for Gazprom’s gas. Chişinău’s policy 
changed in August 2009 when power was taken 
by the AIE.
The linchpin of the energy diversification pol-
icy pursued by the new government has been 
the construction of an interconnector between 
the Romanian and the Moldovan gas transmis-
sion networks. In May 2010, the two countries 
signed a memorandum for the construction of 
a 43-km pipeline between Iasi in Romania and 
Ungheni in Moldova, with a nominal annual 
transmission capacity of 1.5 bcm. In March last 
year, the project received the status of a ‘na-
tional project’, and the prime ministers of both 
countries officially stated that the interconnec-
tor would be operational by December 2012. 
Despite the political will on both sides, con-
struction work was delayed due to a series 
of problems, mostly of a legal and financial 
nature11. Moreover, when Gazprom agreed 
in November 2012 to extend the existing gas 
contract for another year, the momentum for 
the project waned further. Moldova also strug-
gled to meet the cost of its 11-km section of 
the pipeline, estimated at €9 million. Eventual-
ly, the EU and Romania agreed to cover Mol-
dova’s share of the bill, contributing €3 million 
and €6 million respectively. However in August 
this year, after the tendering process for con-
tractors was completed, Moldova’s share of 
11 The issue of compulsory purchase orders issued to 40 
Romanian citizens to secure land for the planned pipe-
line proved particularly problematic.
The linchpin of the energy diversification 
policy pursued by the new government has 
been the construction of an 43-km long in-
terconnector between the Romanian and 
the Moldovan gas transmission networks.
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the cost was reduced to €6.65 million12. Mean-
while, the cost of Romania’s 32-km section of 
the pipeline, estimated at €20–€22 million, is 
to be covered almost entirely by Bucharest, 
with only a small contribution (€4 million) from 
the EU. Further delays to the project have been 
caused by a political crisis in Moldova, which 
affected the country for five months from the 
beginning of this year. The crisis eventually 
abated in late May when a new government, 
led by Iurie Leance, came to power. The sub-
sequent relative stabilisation of Moldova’s po-
litical scene allowed for work on the project to 
be resumed. On a visit to Chişinău in mid-July, 
Romania’s president Traian Basescu announced 
that construction of the pipeline would begin 
on 27 August, with a view to completing the 
project by December 2013.
The uncertain future 
of the diversification project
The plans to diversify the region’s energy sup-
plies by the end of the decade, thanks to the 
Iasi-Ungheni interconnector, appear unrealistic 
for at least two reasons:
• The lack of a necessary gas infrastructure 
in Moldova, and delays in the construction 
of new infrastructure.
It seems unlikely that the Iasi-Ungheni gas pipe-
line will be put into operation by the deadline 
set by Romanian and Moldovan politicians. 
12 This figure was proposed by a consortium of three Ro-
manian companies, JV Habaue Pipeline Systems SRL, Ins-
pet, and IPM-Partners România, who won a contract for 
the construction of the Moldovan section of the inter-
connector.
According to the timeframe announced in 2012, 
the implementation of the project was likely to 
take about seventeen months. It is therefore un-
likely that the project could be completed and 
launched within just four months13. In fact, at 
the start of the construction work, Prime Minis-
ter Leanca revised the earlier completion date to 
April 2014, although it should be stressed that 
this date is also just a projection14. According to 
press reports, the parliament in Bucharest has 
not yet ratified an agreement on the section 
of the pipeline running under the border river 
Prut, which is to link the two legs of the pipe-
line. This delay, in turn, is preventing the gov-
ernments from launching a bidding process for 
potential constructors of this section15 It is also 
unclear how the estimated completion date will 
be affected by the unexpected increase in the 
total cost of the project. Until August of this 
year, the interconnector was expected to cost 
approximately €19 million, although those es-
timates have since proved inaccurate. Although 
the cost of the Moldovan section of the pipeline 
has fallen by €2.4 million (from €9 million to 
€6.6 million), the cost of the Romanian section 
has actually risen by €11 million (from €10 mil-
lion to €21 million). Consequently, just a few 
weeks before the launch of the construction 
work, the total cost of the interconnector un-
expectedly rose by 40%, reaching €28 million 
euro16. It also seems that the delays in the im-
13 For comparative purposes, the construction of a 50-km 
pipeline between Ungheni and Bălți took Moldova-GAZ 
about 12 months. Moreover, a contract regulating the 
financing of the project, signed between Moldova and 
the EU on 8 August 2013, sets the length of the proj-
ect at 17 months: http://www.mec.gov.md/comunicate/
contractul-de-finantare-a-constructiei-gazoductului-ia-
si-ungheni-a-fost-semnat/
14 Just a few days after the official launch on 27 August, 
construction work was suspended. According to Roma-
nian press reports, the work is to be resumed in Octo-
ber.
15 http://adevarul.ro/moldova/actualitate/pe-santierul-
gazoductului-iasi-ungheni-bate-vantul-1_522573c-
8c7b855ff563dc61c/index.html
16 The official cost of the project has been estimated at 
approximately €26 million. This figure does not however 
include the additional €2 million required for the con-
struction of a link under the River Prut.
Reaching the pipeline annual transmis-
sion capacity of 1.5 bcm would require 
the construction of a new compression 
station and a gas pipeline running from 
Ungheni directly to Chişinău.
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plementation of the project have been partly 
caused by the ongoing conflict between the 
President and the Prime Minister of Romania. 
Both politicians strongly support the construc-
tion of the pipeline, but they have been trying 
to downplay each other’s role in the project in 
order to gain political advantage.
There is also the added issue of the pipeline’s 
capacity. Under the current plans, the pipeline is 
to transport up to 1.5 bcm of gas a year, which 
would meet Moldova’s total energy needs (ex-
cluding Transnistria). However, reaching this ca-
pacity would require the construction of a new 
compression station and a 120-km gas pipeline 
running from Ungheni directly to Chişinău, 
and the Moldavian capital uses 50-60% of all 
gas consumed in Moldova. Until the addition-
al infrastructure is in place, the interconnec-
tor will be able to work at just 10% capacity, 
and will only supply enough gas to meet the 
needs of the areas lying outside Ungheni and 
the needs of the free economic zone located in 
the city17. Current estimates place the cost of 
constructing the compression station and the 
pipeline linking Ungheni with the capital at €20 
million and €170 million respectively18, and the 
work is expected to take about five years. At 
the moment it is unclear how Moldova plans to 
pay for this project. Although European Com-
mission representative Günther Oettinger has 
suggested that Brussels could offer Chișinău 
some financial help with the project, there is 
no certainty that the EU or any other interna-
tional organisation would agree to cover most 
of the cost. Finally, the capacity of the pipeline 
will also be affected by the state of Romania’s 
existing infrastructure, which itself requires sig-
nificant investment19.
• The dependence of Moldova-GAZ and of 
the transmission infrastructure on Gazprom
Theoretically, the interconnector and access 
17 Source: Speech by Moldova’s Economy Minister Valeriu 
Lazar. See.: http://www.kommersant.md/node/19265
18 Some sources suggest the figure to be twice as high. 
19 http://www.europalibera.org/content/article/25116402.html
to Romania’s gas transmission network would 
allow Moldova to purchase gas not only from 
Romania, but also from Hungary and any oth-
er EU country linked to the Romanian pipeline 
network. In reality, however, the distribution 
of any non-Russian gas through the Moldovan 
pipelines is rather impossible at the moment. 
This is because Moldova’s transmission and dis-
tribution network, which is owned by Moldova- 
-GAZ, are controlled not by the authorities in 
Chișinău, but rather by the company’s main 
shareholder – Russia’s Gazprom20. It is almost 
certain that the Russian gas monopoly will try 
to protect both its own interests and the in-
terests of the Russian state by obstructing or 
blocking imports of non-Russian gas to Moldo-
va. Its influence would diminish only if Moldova 
adopted the EU’s Third Energy Package, which 
would allow it to break up Moldova-GAZ; this, 
however, cannot happen before 2020.
Outlook
There is no indication that Moldova will be able 
to end its dependence on Russian gas before the 
end of the current decade. At the moment, Gaz-
prom is not only Moldova’s sole gas supplier, but 
also the sole operator of the country’s gas trans-
mission network. This allows Russia to control 
the supply of gas to the Moldovan market, and 
to block virtually any attempts by Chișinău to 
diversify its gas sources. This, coupled with the 
20 The question also remains of whether Moldova-GAZ 
could potentially take control of the interconnector, 
especially its Ungheni-Chișinău section, once the con-
struction work has been completed. 
It is almost certain that the Russian gas 
monopoly will try to protect both its own 
interests and the interests of the Russian 
state by obstructing or blocking imports of 
non-Russian gas to Moldova.
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lack of an appropriate infrastructure, means that 
the Iasi-Ungheni pipeline will make only a negli-
gible contribution to opening up the Moldovan 
energy market to non-Russian gas. Similarly, the 
interconnector will contribute little to Moldova’s 
bargaining power in energy negotiations with 
Gazprom. Moldova’s position is likely to change 
after the completion of the Ungheni-Chișinău 
pipeline and once Gazprom is stripped of its 
control over Moldova’s transmission network; 
however, this will not happen before 2020.
Meanwhile, it is expected that before work on 
the interconnector is completed, Russia will 
seek to take advantage of its dominant position 
in the Moldovan gas sector. Moscow is likely to 
try to reduce the support of the Moldovan peo-
ple for the pro-European coalition ahead of the 
country’s 2014/2015 presidential elections; it 
will attempt to persuade Chișinău to abandon 
its plans for the implementation of the Third 
Energy Package; and it will seek to hinder Mol-
dova’s plans for closer integration (including 
energy integration) with the European Union. 
For example, the Kremlin could achieve this by 
refusing to renew Moldova’s gas contract in the 
run-up to the elections, or by instigating dis-
ruptions to gas supply during winter time. Such 
a move could significantly reduce public sup-
port for the current government, and ultimate-
ly help the Moldovan Communists take power. 
A change of government would likely prevent 
the adoption of the Third Energy Package, and 
guarantee Russia’s continued control over Mol-
dova-GAZ.
